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This paper discusses the links between income and infectious disease epidemics 
and asks how such links are affected by changing global circumstances. Having money 
and living in a prosperous society protects individuals against health setbacks in general 
and epidemics in particular. Healthy people get more education, are more productive in 
the work force, attract foreign investment, and save more. As better health leads to de-
creases in family size, the consequent change in a country's age structure can boost eco-
nomic growth. Epidemics can obstruct these effects by changing expectations about 
how well an economy will function and by deterring investment and tourism. In many 
instances, the immediate costs of an epidemic are apparent, while the long-term costs 
are unclear. However, when we include the value of human life in the cost, it becomes 
clear that epidemics are extremely costly. Preventing epidemics requires overcoming a 
range of obstacles, as does responding to an epidemic once it begins. Globally, long-
term vulnerability to epidemics may decrease as development standards rise, but a more 
highly interconnected world may actually promote the occurrence of infectious disease 
epidemics. 
  2Introduction 
“Principiis obsta; sero medicina paratur cum mala per longas convalu-
ere moras.” (Ovid, around 17 AD) 
(“Stop it at the start; it is late for medicine to be prepared when disease 
has grown strong through long delays.”) 
The association between health and wealth is well established. Rich countries tend to 
have healthier populations than poor countries. Figure 1 shows that life expectancy, a 
commonly used summary measure of a population's health, increases sharply as income 
per capita rises among poorer countries and continues to rise, though at a much slower 
rate, as countries become wealthier. Between 1995 and 2000, life expectancy at birth in 
the world’s least developed countries was 51 years. In other low-income countries it 
was 59 years, in middle-income countries 70 years, and in high-income countries 78 
years.
2 For decades, it was thought that the causality ran in only one direction – as in-
comes rose, health improved. Recent years, however, have seen increased attention paid 
to assessing the reverse effects, as health has come to be seen as a key driver of eco-
nomic development.  
Figure 1 








0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000
GDP/capita, PPP
























Source: World Bank. World Development Indicators 2004. 
Data are for 2002 or latest available year. 
Note: The circled outliers, from lowest to highest income, are Swaziland, Namibia, Gabon, Bot-
swana, South Africa, Equatorial Guinea, and Luxembourg.  
                                                  
2 Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (2001). Macroeconomics and Health: Investing 
in Health for Economic Development. Geneva: World Health Organisation.  
  3This paper discusses the links between infectious disease epidemics and income and 
asks how these links are affected by changing global circumstances.
3 At the outset we 
must recognize that there is considerable heterogeneity among infectious diseases that 
have the potential to become epidemics – in terms of transmission; latency; prevention, 
treatment, and care; and their short- and long-term economic effects. Regarding trans-
mission, for example, poverty has a greater influence in some diseases than in others. 
Because of the wide range of characteristics that distinguish some epidemic diseases 
from others, detailed consideration of specific diseases is beyond the scope of the paper. 
Part 1 of the paper looks at the mechanisms through which health affects wealth and 
vice versa. It then looks at how epidemics and pandemics in particular interact with 
economic development. Part 2 discusses the challenges facing those attempting to re-
spond to epidemics. Part 3 offers some ideas for overcoming the challenges, while the 
final section provides conclusions.  
In brief, this paper argues that epidemics of infectious diseases can have sizable eco-
nomic impacts – both in the short and long term – and that their management and con-
trol require investment in national and international health systems. When they threaten 
to erupt, control of epidemics should be a priority, given the significant human and eco-
nomic tolls they inflict. Globally, the long-term vulnerability to epidemics should de-
crease as development standards rise, but a more highly interconnected world may actu-
ally promote the occurrence of infectious disease epidemics.
4   
 
Part 1: Health and wealth 
Wealth as a determinant of health 
“Health is the first wealth.” (Ralph Waldo Emerson, The Conduct of 
Life, 1860) 
The view that higher incomes lead to better health stems from several mechanisms. 
Within a population, wealthier individuals can afford the essential products necessary 
for a healthy life: sufficient, nutritious food, adequate housing, clean water, and quality 
                                                  
3 The definition of "epidemic" does not technically include malaria, because it is globally en-
demic. However, malaria is tempo-spatially epidemic and is therefore included in the scope of 
this paper. On the other hand, we do not address "deliberate" epidemics (e.g., ones that may be 
caused by bioterrorism), although many of the arguments made herein apply to those as well. 
We discuss some of the differences between epidemic, pandemic, and endemic diseases below. 
4 The spread of SARS and HIV are cases in point. Still, not every new disease is likely to spread 
wildly, and those arising in very isolated areas do not necessarily pose near-term threats to the 
industrialized world. 
  4health care. They also enjoy better access to information and therefore have more 
knowledge of how to foster and maintain one’s health. The wealthy have a stronger in-
fluence with policymakers than the poor, so their demands for improvements in health 
services are more likely to be acted upon. Wealthier countries and their residents, more-
over, have greater strengths in education, ability to develop and buy medicines and 
other health technologies, training and paying doctors and nurses, building and main-
taining hospitals and clinics, minimizing nosocomial infections (although recent reports 
emphasize the extent to which these are still a problem in developed countries), provid-
ing water and sanitation facilities, (often) using less noxious energy sources, and im-
plementing comprehensive public health campaigns.
5  
The empirical literature, however, is mixed with respect to the link that runs from aver-
age income to population health. Lant Pritchett and Lawrence Summers have found that 
differences in income growth account for 40% of the difference in mortality rate reduc-
tions between countries.
6 Angus Deaton, however, finds that “gains in life expectancy 
have been only weakly correlated with growth rates.”
7 Mortality has declined as in-
comes have risen, but it has also fallen (at least until the advent of HIV/AIDS) in coun-
tries that have remained poor. Some poor countries and regions, notably Cuba and the 
state of Kerala in India, have first-rate health systems and healthy populations. Some 
rich countries, on the other hand, have pockets of ill health (poor communities in the US 
and the OECD, and indigenous populations in the US and Australia, for example).
8 Im-
proving economic conditions can lead to better health, if governments and societies mo-
bilize to bring it about, but the link is not assured.
9 Other factors that may affect popula-
tion health at a given level of income are the distribution of income
10 and the level and 
distribution of health spending and the organization of the health system.
11  
                                                  
5 All of this said, we note that population aging in wealthy countries is one factor that will make 
them more vulnerable to epidemics. 
6 Pritchett, Lant, and Lawrence H. Summers (1996). “Wealthier is Healthier.” Journal of Human 
Resources 31 (4): 842-68. 
7 Deaton, Angus (2004). “Health in an Age of Globalization.” NBER Working Paper No. 
w10669, August. 
8 Sen, Amartya (1993). The Economics of Life and Death.  Scientific American, 268(5): 40-47. 
9 Moreover, developed countries often experience poor health and even epidemics, such as obe-
sity, that are based on behavior. 
10 Kennedy, Bruce P., Ichiro Kawachi, and Deborah Prothrow-Stith. (1996). “Income Distribu-
tion and Mortality: Cross-Sectional Ecological Study of the Robin Hood Index in the United 
States. British Medical Journal. 312: 1004-1007. Wilkinson RG. (1996). Unhealthy Societies. 
The Afflictions of Inequality. London: Routledge.  
11 Anand, Sudhir, and Martin Ravallion (1993). “Human Development in Poor Countries: On 
the Role of Private Incomes and Public Services.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 7:133-50. 
Anand, Sudhir, and  Till Bärnighausen (2004). Human Resources and Health Outcomes: Cross-
Country Econometric Study.  The Lancet, 364 (30 October) 1603-09.  
  5Health as a determinant of wealth 
There are a number of mechanisms through which population health can increase or de-
crease per capita income. First, health can affect income via its intermediate effect on 
education. Healthy children are less likely to suffer from impaired cognitive develop-
ment and better able to attend school regularly.
12 Their parents are more likely to invest 
in their education if they are confident their offspring will live long enough to benefit 
from it. Better-educated children, in turn, have greater potential to contribute to a coun-
try’s economic development when they reach working age.  
Second, good health boosts labor productivity. As with schoolchildren, healthier work-
ers attend work more often and are more mentally alert and physically energetic. This 
effect is particularly important in poor countries, where, unlike in developed countries, 
people whose sickness impedes their ability to do manual labor, often lose what may be 
their only major resource.  Healthier communities, too, mean that workers take less time 
off to care for sick relatives.  
Third, good health promotes saving and investment, which are important drivers of eco-
nomic growth. As life expectancy increases, saving for retirement becomes a more ra-
tional decision for individuals.
13 Retirement savings translate into funds available for 
investment. In addition, healthy, productive workforces are more likely to attract foreign 
investment than sick populations. 
Fourth, health improvements will have both transitional and permanent effects on a 
country’s population age structure, with potentially huge impacts on economic devel-
opment. As health advances begin to reduce infant and child mortality, the number of 
children surviving to adulthood increases. Either rapidly or over a longer period of time, 
parents realize they need to bear fewer offspring in order to attain their desired family 
size, thus prompting a decline in fertility rates. This effect is typically buttressed by ris-
ing levels of female education and labor market opportunities that reduce desired fertil-
ity. Fertility levels also fall in response to the provision of family planning services,
14 
and knowledge about family planning options may increase with access to cultural in-
                                                  
12 Leslie, J. and Dean Jamison, (1990). "Health and Nutrition Considerations in Educational 
Planning: The Cost and Effectiveness of School-Based Interventions." Food and Nutrition Bul-
letin, 12: 204-215; Bhargava, Alok (2001). "Nutrition, Health, and Economic Development: 
Some Policy Priorities". World Health Organization, Commission on Macroeconomics and 
Health. CMH Working Paper Series, Paper No. WG1: 14. Available at 
http://www.cmhealth.org/docs/wg1_paper14.pdf  
13 Bloom, David, David Canning, and Bryan Graham. 2003. ‘Longevity and Life Cycle Sav-
ings’, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2003 (Vol 105, No. 3): 319-338. 
14 Schultz, T. Paul (1997). "The Demand for Children in Low Income Countries," Handbook of 
Population and Family Economics, Vol. 1A, Chapter 8, (eds.) M.R. Rosenzweig and O. Stark, 
Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing. 
  6fluences from outside the local community, such as relevant public service announce-
ments
15 and docudramas
16 on television. The cohort of children born after mortality 
rates fall and before fertility rates decline is larger than both the preceding and succeed-
ing cohorts – often known as a “baby boom” generation. A baby boom cohort has the 
potential, when it reaches adulthood, to swell the workforce, and provide a boost to a 
nation’s economic productivity.
17 The aforementioned fertility decline implies these 
economic gains will not be encumbered by having to support a large number of chil-
dren. 
East Asia appears to have benefited greatly from the effects of its baby boom. Mortality 
in the region declined sharply during the period of the baby boom, likely the result of 
improvements in  sanitation and the introduction of antibiotics and DDT.
18 Eventually, 
fertility rates followed and when the baby boomers reached working age, aided by 
strong education systems and flexible labor market policies that encouraged job crea-
tion, they gave a huge boost to East Asian economies. It has been estimated that this 
“demographic dividend” accounted for one third of the region’s spectacular economic 
growth between 1965 and 1990.
19  
                                                  
15 Hegazi, Sahar, Suzan Kelini, and Gihan Rashti (2002). "Family planning TV spots in Egypt: 
Did they change knowledge, attitudes and practices of women in slum areas in Cairo?" Abstract 
#38946 of November 11 presentation at annual meeting of American Public Health Association. 
Available at: http://apha.confex.com/apha/130am/techprogram/paper_38946.htm 
16 Relevant experience in Bangladesh is documented at 
http://www.jhuccp.org/pubs/ci/7/index.shtml 
17 The economic boost that demographic change can thus provide depends on a country's ability 
to employ its large cohort of working-age people. Policies that lead to such employment are 
therefore crucial. Numerous countries have failed to capitalize on the potential dividend that 
demographic change made available. And since this dividend most often arises from declines in 
mortality and fertility, it creates opportunities during a specific period of time for economic 
growth in a given population. Whether these opportunities spill over into an increased economic 
growth rate in the longer term is unknown. 
18 In the West, however, the decline in mortality from infectious diseases predated the introduc-
tion of antibiotics and vaccines. See T. McKeown, The Role of Medicine: Dream, Mirage, or 
Nemesis. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980, or Armstrong GL, Conn LA, Pinner RW, 
"Trends in infectious disease mortality in the United States during the 20th century." Journal of 
the American Medical Association, 1999 Jan 6;281(1):61-6. For further discussion of this issue, 
see David M. Cutler, Angus S. Deaton, Adriana Lleras-Muney, "The Determinants of Mortal-
ity," NBER Working Paper No. 11963, January 2006, which finds that the application of scien-
tific advances is "the ultimate determinant of health". In explaining mortality differences across 
countries, Samuel Preston stresses the importance of "medical and public health factors" in "The 
Changing Relation between Mortality and Level of Economic Development," Population Stud-
ies, Vol. 29, No. 2. (Jul., 1975), pp. 231-248. See also, Easterlin, R., 1999. "How beneficent is 
the market?  A look at the modern history of mortality." European Review of Economic History 
3(3): 257-294, for research that finds that the determinants of mortality decline involve the ad-
vent of new institutions and policy initiatives that build on an understanding of disease. 
19 Bloom, David E. and Jeffrey Williamson (1998). “Demographic Transitions and Economic 
Miracles in Emerging Asia.” World Bank Economic Review. Bloom, David E., David Canning, 
  7The links between health and wealth are often mutually reinforcing. In East Asia for 
example, a virtuous spiral was created whereby health improvements catalyzed the baby 
boom generation and boosted economic growth.  Some of the fruits of this growth were 
then reinvested in health care, family planning, and education, which further reduced 
fertility rates and lightened the burden the workforce had to support.
20 Vicious spirals 
are also possible. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the infectious disease burden has continued to 
undermine children’s prospects of surviving to adulthood. Fertility rates have therefore 
remained high and, instead of concentrating their resources on one or two children, par-
ents have had to spread their investments in nutrition, health, and education thinly, thus 
limiting their potential for lifting the family out of poverty. The loss of workdays and 
selling of assets to pay for health care not only impoverishes poor families further, but 
also makes it more difficult to cope with future health shocks.  Ruger et al.
21 detail, for 
example, the high cost of outpatient visits by the poor in China, and cite Liu et al
22 to 
the effect that "high health expenditures were a major cause of poverty in rural areas [in 
China]". 
Finally, and turning specifically to recent epidemics: Health scares may deter both in-
vestors and tourists from a country, as the recent SARS epidemic in China and South-
east Asia demonstrated. Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Hong Kong at the height of 
the crisis fell by 62% in one quarter.
23 These observations jibe with the finding of Al-
san, Bloom, and Canning (2006) that FDI into low- and middle-income countries grows 
by 9% for every one-year increase in life expectancy.
24  
Health, then, can have strong effects on economic growth. Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla 
(2004) have found that each additional year of life expectancy raises per capita GDP by 
                                                                                                                                            
and Pia Malaney. 2000. “Demographic Change and Economic Growth in Asia.” Population and 
Development Review, 26: 257–90. Bloom, David E., David Canning, and Jaypee Sevilla. 2002. 
The Demographic Dividend: A New Perspective on the Economic Consequences of Population 
Change. Santa Monica, California: RAND, MR–1274. 
20 Bloom, David E. and David Canning (2001). “Demographic Change and Economic Growth: 
The Role of Cumulative Causality.” In Nancy Birdsall, Allen C. Kelley, and Stephen Sinding, 
eds, Population Matters: Demographic Change, Economic Growth, and Poverty in the Devel-
oping World. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
21 Ruger, Jennifer Prah, Dean Jamison, David Bloom, and David Canning (2006). "Health and 
the Economy". In Michael H. Merson, Robert E. Black, and Anne J. Mills, eds, International 
Public Health: Diseases, Programs, Systems and Policies, Sudbury, MA: Jones and Bartlett 
Publishers, 601-647. 
22 Liu, Y., S. Hu, W. Fu, and W.C. Hsiao (1998). "Is community financing necessary and feasi-
ble for rural China?" In M.L. Barer, T.E. Getzen, and G.L.Stoddart (eds.), Health, health care 
and health economics: Perspectives on distribution. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
23 Tam, J (2003). “SARS slashes FDI inflows by 62 per cent.” The Standard: Greater China’s 
Business Newspaper. 1 October. 
24 Alsan, Marcella, David E Bloom, and David Canning (2006). “The Effect of Population 
Health on Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to Low- and Middle-Income Countries”, World 
Development, April, 2006 (Vol. 34, No. 4), forthcoming. 
  84%.
25 GDP per capita does not provide a full picture of the economic impacts of im-
proved health, however, since health improvements, by reducing mortality, boost popu-
lation size as well as productivity. Health reversals, conversely, reduce population size. 
When the value of the extra lives that result from health improvements is taken into ac-
count, the effect of health improvements on economies will be much greater than the 
effect on per capita GDP alone.
26 In addition, GDP per capita, since it is an average, 
does not account for the greater economic benefits that may accrue to the poor, as com-
pared to the rich, when population health improves. 
The foregoing arguments are germane to showing a causal link from health to prosper-
ity, but much research remains to be done. Efforts to assess and quantify these links are 
severely hampered by lack of data (in the cases of plague and influenza) or by reverse 
causality between GDP and health (in the case of HIV/AIDS).
27 Many studies of the 
economic impacts of epidemics, such as that of Brainerd and Siegler (2003) and Bloom 
and Mahal (1997a), focus on GDP per capita effects, ignoring the potential for duplicat-
ing the longer-term but very significant changes in education, fertility, and savings rates 
that may have resulted from the influenza epidemic.
28 In addition, as the SARS case 
vividly illustrates, expectations have a very significant role (more than ever), which can 
lead to economic effects vastly out of proportion to the number of infected people. This 
suggests that one take care not to extrapolate economic effects on the basis of earlier 
epidemics, which arose in a far less integrated world. Expectations, however, are only 
one factor in retrospectively evaluating the response to a budding epidemic. In the face 
of uncertainty about an agent's contagiousness, how fatal it is likely to be, and how it is 
transmitted, caution makes sense. 
In short, the links between health and wealth change over time and vary in different 
contexts – the effects of one on the other are not inevitable and are often unpredictable. 
Health is, however, clearly an intrinsic part of the development process. A country’s 
wealth (and indeed its health) can often be enhanced by traditional measures such as 
opening up to trade, promoting exports, restructuring or eliminating inefficient state-
owned enterprises, improving infrastructure, and investing in education. It can also be 
enhanced by investments in health. Specific, cost-effective entry points such as efforts 
                                                  
25 In principle, this effect is net of the reverse causal effect that runs from higher income to life 
expectancy. See Bloom, David E, David Canning and Jaypee Sevilla (2004). “The Effect of 
Health on Economic Growth: A Production Function Approach.” World Development, Vol. 32 
(January), pp 1-24. 
26 Bloom, David E., David Canning and Dean T Jamison (2004). “Health, Wealth, and Wel-
fare”, Finance and Development, March 2004, Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 10-15. 
27 Bloom and Mahal (1997a), op cit. 
28 See, for example, Andrew Noymer and Michel Garenne, "The 1918 Influenza Epidemic’s 
Effects on Sex Differentials in Mortality in the United States," Population and Development 
Review. Volume 26, No. 3, 2000, for a discussion of the demographic effects of the epidemic. 
  9to reduce infant mortality via vaccines or to improve maternal health via family plan-
ning programs can, by changing a country’s age structure and increasing labor produc-
tivity, have resounding long-term economic effects. Neglect of such issues, on the other 
hand, can contribute to economic stagnation or impoverishment.  
Epidemics, pandemics, and economic prosperity  
Epidemic: “The occurrence in a community or region of cases of an ill-
ness, specific health-related behaviour, or other health-related events 
clearly in excess of normal expectancy. The community or region and the 
period in which the cases occur are specified precisely. The number of 
cases indicating the presence of an epidemic varies according to the 
agent, size, and type of population exposed; previous experience or lack 
of exposure to the disease; and time and place of occurrence…Generally, 
a disease that exhibits large inter-annual variability can be considered as 
epidemic.” (World Health Organization
29) 
Pandemic: “An epidemic occurring over a very wide area (several coun-
tries or continents) and usually affecting a large proportion of the popula-
tion.” (US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
30) 
Endemic: "The constant presence of a disease or infectious agent within 
a given geographic area or population group; may also refer to the usual 
prevalence of a given disease within such area or group." (World Health 
Organization
31) 
The subject of this paper is epidemics and their relationship to economic outcomes. 
Since pandemics are simply epidemics spread over a wide area, a discussion of the two 
naturally goes hand in hand. Endemicity, however, presents a slightly different situa-
tion. First, some diseases that are endemic (such as malaria) periodically cause epidem-
ics, as they break out into, or become more prevalent in, a specific population. AIDS 
and tuberculosis are also endemic in many areas. Each of these diseases, in part by vir-
tue of its endemicity, brings with it economic effects that are likely to be long term and 
that have been the subject of much consideration. Epidemics are of a more well-defined 
time and geographic scope. Their economic effects are more likely to be short term, al-
though they can also have long-term economic consequences. 
                                                  
29 Adapted by WHO from Last J.M., A Dictionary of Epidemiology, 2001. 
30 http://www.cdc.gov/excite/library/glossary.htm 
31 Adapted by WHO from Last J.M., A Dictionary of Epidemiology, 2001. 
  10Assessing whether the linkages between epidemics and wealth are similar to those be-
tween general health and wealth is complex. This section will ask whether wealth pro-
tects against epidemics, and then whether epidemics affect wealth. 
Epidemics – and we limit our discussion here to epidemics of communicable diseases 
spread by long-known pathogens – are most likely to arise and persist under conditions 
commonly created by poverty.
32,33 First, the spread of infectious diseases often requires 
close and frequent contact between individuals. This, in turn, requires either or both of 
crowded living conditions and a high level of (preferably rapid) mobility. (Recall 
Charles Dickens' graphic descriptions of the overcrowded and poorly ventilated housing 
of the poor and how those conditions abetted the spread of tuberculosis.) Second, poor 
sanitation and hygiene allow bacteria, viruses, parasites (e.g., worms and amoebae), and 
the vectors of transmission to thrive. Third, weak bodies are more easily infected and 
less able to fight infection;
34 where populations are malnourished, left weak by other 
health setbacks, or have a high proportion of very young or very old members, epidem-
ics have the potential to thrive. Fourth, epidemics tend to occur where health systems 
are weakest and therefore incapable of detecting and responding to rapidly evolving 
health threats. Finally, poverty conditions can lead individuals to engage in behaviors 
that facilitate disease transmission (e.g., sex workers, or poor Chinese farmers who sell 
blood in Henan province, who contract HIV). 
Wealth enables people to safeguard themselves against or mitigate the effects of many 
of these risk factors. The wealthy generally have less crowded living space than the 
poor, greater access to health care, drugs, and vaccines (and where state provision is 
weak, they can better afford private care), better sanitation, and better nutrition. Eco-
nomic decline, moreover, often triggers the spread of disease. In Russia in the 1990s, for 
example, political and economic stress had severe effects on health systems. Diphtheria 
thrived, and there was a resurgence of tuberculosis and measles. As Figure 2 shows, the 
                                                  
32 The spread of the SARS virus in Asia is an example.  
33 As with epidemic diseases, endemic diseases are also often abetted by poverty conditions. 
Examples include malaria, tuberculosis, schistosomiasis, dengue fever, and hepatitis B and C. 
34 There is evidence that better nutritional status helps to prevent infection and more evidence 
that it helps in fighting infections. See, for example,  Scrimshaw NS, SanGiovanni JP. Syner-
gism of nutrition, infection, and immunity: an overview. Am J Clin Nutr. 1997 Aug. 
66(2):464S-477S; Bhutta ZA, Bird SM, Black RE, Brown KH, Gardner JM, Hidayat A, Khatun 
F, Martorell R, Ninh NX, Penny ME, Rosado JL, Roy SK, Ruel M, Sazawal S, Shankar A. 
Therapeutic effects of oral zinc in acute and persistent diarrhea in children in developing coun-
tries: pooled analysis of randomized controlled trials. Am J Clin Nutr. 2000 Dec;72(6):1516-22; 
Fawzi W, Msamanga G, Spiegelman D, Hunter DJ. Studies of Vitamins and Minerals and HIV 
Transmission and Disease Progression. J Nutr. 2005 Apr. 135(4):938-44; Villamor E, Fawzi 
WW. Vitamin A supplementation: implications for morbidity and mortality in children. J Infect 
Dis. 2000 Sep. 182 Suppl 1:S122-33. 
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The issue of mobility, however, is more complicated. The rich may be more mobile than 
the poor, and tourism and business travel can lead to greater exposure to disease (trade 
has been a conduit for epidemics since ancient times, and globalization allows disease-
causing microbes to spread faster and further than previously). The mobility of the poor, 
on the other hand, is likely to be more risky. Migration, for example, is a risk factor for 
HIV transmission, as male migrants tend to have social anonymity and cash, and may be 
lonely when separated from their families, leading them to seek commercial sex; female 
migrants are often abused.  
More generally, poor people often move to escape catastrophic events such as war or 
environmental disasters, frequently ending up in crowded, makeshift camps or slums 
where poor sanitary conditions create an ideal environment for epidemics such as ty-
phus and cholera. They may also move to find work. Much of this movement is from 
rural areas into cities, and occurs when cities begin to prosper. Friedrich Engels ob-
served the perils of urbanization in the 19
th century: “Dirty habits,” he wrote, “do no 
great harm in the countryside where the population is scattered. On the other hand, the 
dangerous situation which develops when such habits are practiced among the crowded 
                                                  
35 WHO supplies detailed data online on cause of death for each of 14 region/mortality strata. 
Infectious diseases are the cause of many deaths. To this number we have added respiratory in-
fections, which are not included in the former category. For each region, this sum, divided by 
total deaths, gives the fraction that appears on the vertical axis. The source of the data for the 
horizontal axis is World Bank, World Development Indicators 2004, online. 
  12population of big cities must arouse feelings of apprehension and disgust.”
36 As well as 
offering some protection against epidemics, the changes in living habits (specifically, 
movement from rural to urban areas) that accompany increased incomes can also make 
epidemics more likely to occur. 
The effect of an epidemic disease on the economy is complex and depends upon many 
factors. These include what group of individuals is most at risk for contracting the dis-
ease, the natural history of the illness (e.g., how long the epidemic lasts), and how the 
disease is transmitted (via airborne vs. blood-borne pathogen).  
Annual epidemics often reserve their harshest impacts for youth and the elderly (al-
though this is not necessarily so for pandemics).
37 By reducing dependency ratios, this 
pattern can have positive impacts on economies – with fewer non-earners and a reduced 
number of dependents for those who are earning, per capita income is likely to rise (al-
though it would be difficult to argue that these income gains offset the welfare costs of 
premature deaths associated with the flu). Of course, when a depleted youth generation 
enters the workforce, the reduced number of workers may itself become an economic 
problem.  
Given the vast trail of death and morbidity left by epidemics, they obviously diminish 
human well-being. Even where they affect people of working age, however, epidemics 
may not have negative economic impacts on income per capita. The Black Death, which 
wiped out an estimated quarter of Western Europe’s population in the 14
th century, is 
thought by some to have had a positive effect on incomes,
38 (which could have resulted 
from a reduced number of individuals benefiting from and building on the same set of 
fixed assets, including, for example, land and physical capital). Others have concluded 
that it had little or no effect on incomes (at least in England and France).
39 The 1918 flu 
epidemic killed over 40 million people worldwide, but its economic effect in the US 
was, if anything, positive.
40 By contrast, Bloom and Mahal found no evidence of a sig-
                                                  
36 Friedrich Engels (1845). The Condition of the Working-Class in England.Leipzig: new edi-
tion, Stuttgart, 1892. 
37 See Simonsen L, Clarke MJ, Schonberger LB, Arden NH, Cox NJ, Fukuda K., "Pandemic 
versus epidemic influenza mortality: a pattern of changing age distribution," Journal of  Infec-
tious Diseases. 1998 Jul;178(1):53-60. 
38 Clive Bell and Maureen Lewis (2004). "The economic implications of epidemics old and 
new", World Economics, Vol. 5, No. 4, October-December. 
39 Bloom, David E. and Ajay Mahal (1997a). “AIDS, Flu, and the Black Death: Impacts on 
Economic Growth and Well-Being’, in David Bloom and Peter Godwin, eds, The Economics of 
HIV and AIDS: The Case of South and South East Asia, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
1997, 22–52.
40 Brainerd E and M. Siegler (2003). “The Economic Effects of the 1918 Influenza Epidemic.” 
No 3791, CEPR Discussion Papers. The authors note that a disproportionate share of those who 
died were of working age. They then "examine the impact of this exogenous shock on subse-
  13nificant effect from that epidemic on output (i.e., acreage sown) per capita in India.
41 
When there are deaths, of course, there are welfare losses. But these are cases where, 
although the economy may have been disrupted, there was no long-term negative effect 
on per-capita income. These results highlight the fact that many economies are flexible 
and resilient, and that people adapt to unforeseen changes. Finally, even though these 
epidemics caused many deaths, some of them came and went quickly, with the possible 
consequence that the economic dislocations that arise from morbidity, treatment, and 
transitional social arrangements did not last long enough to engender a long-term effect, 
at least with respect to the measures used in this literature. 
Writers on this topic, however, are most often looking only at the economic well-being 
of those who survive. In a high unemployment situation, total output may not change, 
since new workers take the place of those who die (in some instances, however, as when 
skilled workers die, there may be clear and negative financial repercussions and output 
may fall). Perhaps most typically, GDP per capita may rise, at least initially, when some 
people die. Longer-term equilibration may minimize this effect, however, and overall it 
is not clear whether GDP per capita is greatly affected either positively or negatively.
42 
Recent research by Mahal, however, has uncovered signs that as the AIDS epidemic 
grows, there may be negative effects on a country's GDP per capita.
43
If we take the economic value of human life into account, however, it is clear that epi-
demics have a high cost. How high, of course, depends on the economic value one as-
signs to life. People who die during epidemics, along with their families, obviously lose 
out economically. One could, moreover, add other losses to this if one places an eco-
nomic value on intangible impacts such as the lost companionship and love felt by 
friends and relatives of the dead. A thorough discussion of valuing the cost of life ap-
pears in Viscusi and Aldy (2003).
44
                                                                                                                                            
quent economic growth using data on US states for the 1919-30 period. Controlling for numer-
ous factors including initial income, density, urbanization, human capital, climate, the sectoral 
composition of output, geography, and the legacy of slavery, the results indicate a large and ro-
bust positive effect of the influenza epidemic on per capita income growth across states during 
the 1920s."  
41 Bloom and Mahal (1997a) op cit.  
42 For example, notwithstanding the mixed evidence on the long-term effect of the Black Death 
on wages, it is clear from the diaries of plantation owners that the very short run effect was a 
substantial elevation of wages. See Hirshleifer, Jack  (1987). Economic Behaviour in Adversity. 
Chicago:  The University of Chicago Press. 
43 Mahal, A. (2004). “The economic implications of inertia on HIV/AIDS and the benefits of 
action.” Economic and Political Weekly, 39(10): pp.1049-63. 
44 Viscusi, W. Kip, and Joseph E. Aldy (2003) "The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical Re-
view of Market Estimates Throughout the World". Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 27(1): 5-76. 
  14In recent years, some epidemics have had clear negative economic effects. The 
HIV/AIDS pandemic too, while not (yet) significantly affecting per capita GDP, has had 
major effects at the household level, particularly on the poor.
45,46 As well as suffering 
from lost earnings, poor families hit by AIDS have to draw down savings and sell assets 
to pay for treatment. Relatives of infected individuals may have to take time off work or 
withdraw from school to provide care. A family’s future economic prospects are thereby 
further impaired; indeed, even the immediate spending can be catastrophic to the indi-
vidual family. The long-term costs of HIV/AIDS, and in particular the vast scale on 
which social and economic effects are likely to be felt (because of decreased investment 
in human capital), are laid out in Bell, Devarajan, Gersbach. (2003).
47 In addition, the 
long latency period of the HIV virus means that the long-term course of the disease is 
difficult to predict, as are, therefore, the long-term economic effects. 
AIDS may also affect businesses. In a global survey of 8719 firms conducted by the 
World Economic Forum in 2004,
48 business leaders expressed some concern over the 
current and future impacts of the pandemic on their workforces and other aspects of 
company operations.
49 16% of respondents expected the virus to have serious impacts 
on their business. In low-income countries this figure rose to 35%, and in Sub-Saharan 
Africa to 45%. Although few firms reported current negative impacts on productivity, 
revenues, and medical expenses, in low-income countries over 1 in 10 respondents had 
already experienced serious impacts on each of these aspects of their business.  
AIDS has, in recent years, begun to claim the lives of large numbers of people, espe-
cially in countries that were hit early by the virus. It is possible – some would say quite 
likely – that the economic effects will grow over time, as dwindling working-age popu-
lations (which are disproportionately affected by the disease) have to support burgeon-
ing numbers of children and orphans and social breakdown becomes a reality. Educa-
                                                  
45 Bloom, David and Ajay Mahal (1997b). “Does the AIDS Epidemic Threaten Economic 
Growth?’, Journal of Econometrics, 105–124; Bloom, David E., Ajay Mahal, Larry Rosenberg, 
Jaypee Sevilla, David Steven, and Mark Weston (2004). Asia’s Economies and the Challenge of 
AIDS. Asian Development Bank.  
46 Although the poor have in general been the most affected segment of society, GDP can still 
remain only minimally affected. This is because the total economic output of the poor is in 
many instances sufficiently small that decreased output by the poor has only a small effect on 
total GDP. In countries in which the poor contribute a sizable share of GDP, this explanation 
suffices only if a small percentage of the poor are affected. 
47 Bell, C., S. Devarajan, and H. Gersbach. 2003. “Thinking about the Long-run Economic 
Costs of AIDS.  World Bank.  (October)  (Draft). Available at 
http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/webfac/bardhan/e271_f03/thinking.pdf  
48 World Economic Forum Global Health Initiative (2005). Business and HIV/AIDS: Commit-
ment and Action? http://www.weforum.org/pdf/Initiatives/GHI_Report_2005_Final.pdf 
49 For a review of the previous year's  report, see David E Bloom, Lakshmi Reddy Bloom, 
David Steven, and Mark Weston (2004). “Business and HIV/AIDS: Who Me?” World Eco-
nomic Forum, Geneva.  
  15tion systems have already begun to suffer because of deaths among teachers.  Orphans, 
in particular, are subject to becoming a particularly uneducated segment of the next 
generation. Weakened education systems that in many instances are already inadequate 
are likely to impair countries' efforts to strengthen their economies. 
In the past decade, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Bovine Spongi-
form Encephalitis (BSE)
50 have also had economic impacts. The panic caused by these 
diseases led to economic costs that were disproportionate to the number of cases. Al-
though fewer than a thousand people died in the 2003 SARS outbreak, for example, 
tourism and business in affected areas were hit hard, with some estimates putting the 
cost of the virus at over $11 billion.
51 The European Association of Animal Production, 
meanwhile, has estimated that BSE, which has caused fewer than 200 deaths, has so far 
cost the 15 European Union states at least $110 billion.
52,   53
It appears, then, that the relationship between epidemics and wealth has many similari-
ties to that between overall health and wealth. Economic growth is likely to protect 
populations against health setbacks and against epidemics (although the examples of 
BSE and SARS show that even the richest countries cannot afford to be complacent). 
Both epidemics and other health problems, moreover, can impede economic develop-
ment and set off vicious spirals whereby poor health leads to reduced wealth and makes 
the task of improving health ever harder. It is possible, however, that only in cases 
where epidemics are sustained over a long time period will the effects on survivors 
prove harmful at a macroeconomic level (although those who die sustain clear economic 
losses, along with their families). Short epidemics may have negative effects on indi-
vidual households and firms, but the overall damage to economies will be less severe.  
It is relevant to note here that, as with epidemics, endemic diseases can also have major 
economic consequences. On the individual and family level, for example, it is clear that 
malaria's effects can be economically devastating. And at the macro level, according to 
the report of the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, high malaria prevalence 
in an area can reduce economic growth by over 1 percentage point per annum.
54
                                                  
50 BSE is epizootic (i.e., it affects many animals in a certain region and time period). But its 
much less prevalent human variant, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD), has provoked widespread 
fear. 
51 Trish Saywell, Geoffrey A Fowler, Shawn W Crispin (2003). The Cost of SARS: $11 Billion 
and Rising. Far Eastern Economic Review. 24 April. 
52 http://europa.eu.int/comm/research/press/2004/pr1805en.cfm 
53 $110 billion is roughly 1% of the GDP of the EU. But the $110 billion loss, which may not 
have all occurred during one year, is a capital loss, not an income loss. The share of income lost 
would be much tinier. 
54 Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (2001). 
  16Given time to accumulate, as in the cases of malaria and HIV/AIDS, micro-level effects 
may have macro-level consequences. The exceptions to this are short epidemics that 
cause large panics. SARS, for example, wreaked economic havoc not because of the 
number of cases of the disease but because of the alarm it provoked and uncertainty 
about its ease and routes of transmission. In addition, the chaos caused by SARS was as 
severe in Toronto as it was in Beijing and Bangkok, despite the fact that Toronto had 
significantly fewer cases. 
Part 2: The challenge of epidemics  
Epidemics have afflicted human civilizations for ages. The challenge they present has 
not always been met, and many millions have died as epidemics have ravaged popula-
tions with no effective means of resistance. Although better sanitation, rapid response 
measures, and specific medical advances have given humanity new tools to resist epi-
demics, the forces of  "globalization" have, at the same time, abetted the spread of epi-
demics. For example, more frequent international travel facilitates the access of many 
pathogens to new populations. Similarly, increased international trade during the last 
couple of decades has meant that disease-causing agents from one area can more easily 
find their way to regions that were previously thought immune to a particular disease. 
Some have argued that competitive pressures and freer trade have led to export pres-
sures that abet the spread of infections, as seems to have been true with Bovine Spongi-
form Encephalitis, the Nipah virus, and avian flu. Other twentieth-century developments 
are also relevant here: massive movement from rural areas to cities and the accompany-
ing poverty in peri-urban areas makes epidemics more likely. Global climate change, 
too, may be affecting the spread of malaria, dengue fever, and yellow fever. Higher-
temperature ocean currents have been linked to increased cholera rates.
55
One of the sources of the panic created by some epidemics (but not all of them) is their 
unpredictability, which flows in part from some of the new factors cited above. This ap-
plies as much to their economic impacts as to their likely transmission speed and direc-
tion. As the examples of HIV/AIDS and SARS show, different epidemics can have 
widely differing economic effects. 
This presents policymakers with two main challenges. First, their response needs to be 
swift. Rapid action taken by the global health community was instrumental in limiting 
the impacts of SARS. Had the response been slower and the disease allowed to spread 
further, its economic effects would have been even more catastrophic. In contrast, the 
sluggish speed of the reaction to HIV/AIDS in many parts of the world has greatly in-
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  17creased the virus’s impacts. Second, the response needs to be flexible. Epidemics can 
change quickly, forcing decision-makers to act without complete information. The ini-
tial effects of HIV/AIDS, for example, were felt by gay communities and injecting drug 
users in the West. Policy-makers were caught off guard when they began to realize that 
it was spreading rapidly among heterosexuals in Africa.  
This need for flexibility in policy response applies, of course, to resource allocation. 
The costs of less-sudden health problems, such as chronic disease or mental illness, are 
relatively easy to forecast and budget for. The unpredictability of epidemics, however, 
makes planning for the effective allocation of human and physical resources difficult. 
Diverting funds to counter epidemics may, for instance, temporarily halt progress made 
against non-communicable diseases. It may also require health workers to take on new 
responsibilities for which they are not fully equipped. The costs of an epidemic, more-
over, may change suddenly as it spreads or is contained. Avoiding waste while ensuring 
resources are sufficient to tackle a disease is a difficult balancing act, particularly for 
policymakers who have not previously been confronted with such a threat. This chal-
lenge is all the more difficult because anticipatory investment is required. 
Another of the unique challenges posed by epidemics is the requirement they impose for 
people to limit their movement. As long ago as the 14
th century, villages afflicted by the 
plague were cordoned off from the rest of the society to limit the disease’s spread. In the 
more recent case of SARS, travelers were strongly advised by the World Health Organi-
zation not to visit high-risk areas such as southern China, Hong Kong, and even To-
ronto. Restricting movement, particularly in a globalizing world, has serious negative 
implications for tourism and sometimes for trade, as well. These impacts will likely be 
felt more strongly in industrializing or industrialized countries, where the requirement 
for movement is greater than in predominantly agricultural economies. 
Epidemics that cross national borders and become pandemics pose further taxing chal-
lenges and mean that few countries can afford to drop their guard. Dengue fever, for 
example, had for long been confined to tropical regions until spreading into temperate 
zones in recent years, largely as a result of the increase in air travel and the shipping of 
used tires harboring dengue-carrying Aedes mosquitoes.
56 For epidemics not to become 
pandemics, countries need to be constantly alert to their occurrence in neighboring and 
                                                  
56 It is sometimes suggested that the resurgence of tuberculosis in New York City in the early 
1990s, was due to, among other factors, immigrants importing drug-resistant forms of the bacil-
lus into the city. This, however, appears to be an urban myth, as the primary causes seem to 
have been the spread of HIV – TB is an opportunistic infection – and prison crowding stemming 
from the drug war of the1980s. New York's public health system had become unused to dealing 
with the disease and was thus at first unable to cope effectively with the new threat. 
  18even far-off societies, and aware of the risks to which their links with affected countries 
expose them. 
Perhaps the biggest test posed by epidemics is the propensity of the underlying disease 
agent to mutate. Success against one strain of a disease (either by natural resistance or 
medical intervention) can open a niche for the emergence of a new strain, and new 
strains are likely to be more virulent. The emergence of new epidemics – in the past 15 
years alone, hantavirus, SARS, and avian flu have hit the international headlines – and 
the resurgence of old ones demands great agility and ingenuity from medical practitio-
ners, drug developers, public health professionals, and policymakers.  
The best way of countering drug-resistance, of course, is to prevent it, and the best way 
of preventing it is to halt the spread of disease in the first place through the use of vac-
cines, bed nets, elimination of vectors, educational programs, etc. Resistance occurs 
through the use of antimicrobials. Overuse is common in industrialized countries, where 
patients are inappropriately prescribed antimicrobials for viral infections (e.g., the 
common cold) or when antibiotics that are used by people are also employed in bulk as 
growth-promoters in livestock, which is common in OECD countries. Misuse may oc-
cur when patients lack access to appropriate therapy, but also when the general public is 
misinformed and individuals successfully demand unnecessary antibiotics. Finally, un-
deruse is typically encountered among the poor, when inadequate financial resources 
impede the completion or continuation of treatment regimens. With diseases such as 
tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS, where drugs are now available, it is better – from a popula-
tion health point of view – to have no treatment at all than “bad” treatment.  
While reacting speedily to epidemics is important, undue haste to push people onto un-
derfunded treatment regimens may have dire unintended consequences. Recent research 
on effective strategies for using anti-retrovirals in treating HIV epidemics shows that 
determining the optimal use of such drugs is extremely complex.
57 The WHO has made 
significant efforts to summarize the world's response to increasing drug resistance and 
has highlighted the steps needed to counteract it.
58
There are two forms of resistance: primary and secondary. Primary resistance occurs 
when a person is infected with a drug-resistant strain harbored by another individual. 
Thus, even when antimicrobials are not available in a given community, resistant strains 
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58 World Health Organization. 2001. WHO Global Strategy for Containment of Antimicrobial 
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  19can enter the population through trade and tourism. Secondary resistance develops when 
an individual’s treatment is inadequate to achieve complete cure or suppression of the 
infectious agent and mutant strains develop that are not susceptible to the previous ther-
apy.  New models predict that drug-resistant strains of TB will soon come to dominate 
the drug-sensitive type.
59 This should alarm policymakers in wealthy and poor countries 
alike, given the ease of transmissibility of TB and the woeful lack of novel therapeutics 
to tackle this ancient microbe. 
Thus, with international borders becoming ever more porous and the ability to treat in-
fectious disease threats now within reach, it is essential for the international community 
to provide appropriate and sustainable therapy to those seeking treatment before resis-
tance becomes unmanageable.  
The recent emergence of Avian, H5N1 flu on the world scene has drawn renewed atten-
tion to epidemics and is an example of the challenges posed by new pathogens. Al-
though flus in birds do not usually infect humans, they can do so on occasion, most 
likely by contact with infected poultry. The first observed case in humans took place in 
Hong Kong in 1997.  During 2003 and 2004, humans contracted bird flu in Thailand 
and Vietnam. The death rate of infected people in the most recent set of reported cases 
is around 70%. If the virus mutates and human-to-human transmission becomes possi-
ble, a worldwide avian flu pandemic could occur.
60 Alternatively a trading of genetic 
material between the avian and human forms of the virus could lead to an epidemic. 
(Such trading is particularly likely to occur in pigs, which can host both the avian and 
human forms of the virus. The most virulent form of the avian flu virus, – (A) H5N1 – 
is particularly adept at obtaining genetic material from other viruses, a process known as 
"reassortment". Such trading could lead to much easier human-to-human transmis-
sion.)
61,62 A virus that resembles the one that caused the 1918 flu epidemic could "kill 
175 to 350 million people",
63 and some estimates go higher. (On the other hand, these 
very high estimates do not take into account the possibility that the death rates reported 
so far may be higher than the actual mortality rate, since people who contracted mild 
                                                  
59 Cohen, Ted, and Megan Murray, 2004. Modeling epidemics of multi-drug resistant M. tuber-
culosis of heterogeneous fitness. Nature Medicine 10:10, October. 
60 Website of the United States Centers for Disease Control, http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/gen-
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61 http://www.mayoclinic.com/invoke.cfm?id=DS00566 
62 A detailed explanation of the risks of an avian flu epidemic in humans appears in Ferguson 
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  20cases may not be included in the data.)
64 A recent and careful estimate of the possible 
human and economic consequences suggests that, in a worst-case scenario, 142 million 
people could die and global economic losses could reach $4.4 trillion.
65 In any case, the 
economic and human consequences of such a pandemic are impossible to predict with 
any certainty, but the scale of the potential disaster warrants broad and serious interna-
tional cooperation now. Measures to keep the disease from spreading from animals to 
humans are essential, as are preparations for containing it should it make further inroads 
among humans. 
Part 3: Confronting the challenges 
Epidemic prevention 
Measures to confront epidemics can take the form of either prevention or treatment. Al-
though it is impossible to prepare fully for diseases that do not yet exist or have been 
latent for many years, it is feasible to change behavior and strengthen health systems, 
sanitation, and people's bodies so that epidemics are both less likely and less damaging.  
Similar to the great majority of microbes that affect human beings, many new viruses 
reaching humans (HIV/AIDS, hantavirus, and avian flu, for example) are thought to 
have originated in animals. Poor hygienic practices or behavior that brings humans into 
contact with animals can lead to epidemics. In other instances, a failure to adhere to 
drug regimens is believed to be at least partially responsible for the emergence of drug-
resistant tuberculosis. Modifying human behavior to limit these risks is far from un-
achievable. The provision of high quality, convenient and affordable health services are 
essential aspects of an effective strategy to increase adherence at the population level. 
One such example is the successful delivery of antiretrovirals (ARVs) to treat HIV-
infected persons in rural Haiti. Through a combination of community health workers, 
free antiretrovirals (ARVs) to treat HIV/AIDS, and an intensive information campaign, 
the Haiti project has served as a model for increasing adherence in resource-scarce set-
tings.
66
Closing the gap between health professionals and communities, so that relationships of 
trust are established and health messages are thereby more easily transmitted, is also 
important. A study by the Navrongo Health Research Centre in northern Ghana found 
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  21that moving nurses into communities and mobilizing community volunteers to help 
them reduced mortality in an area by 30%. Part of this reduction was due to improved 
access to treatment, but much was also due to the behavior-related messages dissemi-
nated to communities by the nurses. The strategy has since been adopted as part of 
Ghana’s national health care policy. Of  course, such dissemination is only useful if the 
messages are adopted by the community.  
Health systems’ readiness for epidemics can also be improved. Reliable epidemiological 
surveillance is critical to identifying new health threats. Southern China’s weak surveil-
lance systems meant that the SARS virus had already begun to spread far beyond the 
original source area before policy-makers knew of its existence. The World Health Or-
ganization’s global surveillance systems were effective in picking up new cases of the 
disease once it began to roam the world, but local monitoring capacity is more impor-
tant if epidemics are to be nipped in the bud. It is in every country’s interest for local 
disease surveillance in other countries to be effective – if your neighbor fails to spot a 
fledgling epidemic, you may well suffer (though not always, since some epidemics die 
out because of low transmissibility or other reasons). International efforts to improve 
surveillance are therefore needed, with countries that possess effective systems assisting 
those that lack them.  
In the case of a new epidemic, especially when the transmission mechanism has not yet 
been identified, the first line of defense is isolation and quarantine. Even these meas-
ures, however, need preliminary research to establish the mode of transmission. Many 
of the most infectious and dangerous diseases are those that spread by airborne trans-
mission. These may require stringent quarantine measures, whose effectiveness varies 
considerably from one situation to another.  
Particularly important for readying health systems to manage epidemics is the focused 
allocation of resources. Poor countries, as we have seen, are most vulnerable to severe 
infectious disease outbreaks, and in these resource-constrained settings, it is vital to put 
epidemic preparedness at the center of health strategies. In societies where epidemics 
pose the main threat, directing resources towards preventing and coping with them is 
likely to have a greater impact on a population’s health than dealing with chronic dis-
eases or providing expensive surgical operations. Training health workers to respond to 
infectious diseases, for example, and ensuring immunization programs reach those – 
often the poor – who are most at risk, may prove a cost-effective approach to health 
care.
67 Simple, cheap, disease-prevention strategies such as the provision of insecticide-
                                                  
67 Even when some of the population cannot be reached by immunization programs, herd im-
munity has a positive spillover effect, as many non-immunized people are protected from dis-
ease because of those who are immunized.  
  22treated bed nets to combat malaria have also been proven to have impacts on health out-
comes that go beyond the immediate users.
68 Where funds and human resources are 
limited, health strategists should not attempt to solve every problem, but should direct 
their efforts to areas where they can have the greatest effect on health outcomes. In 
some poor countries, this means epidemic prevention, although in most, endemic dis-
eases will merit the greater share of attention.  
Health programs, such as for immunization, are also important for the other main strand 
of epidemic prevention: strengthening human bodies. Strong bodies are better able to 
fend off disease and better able to recover if an epidemic – whether old or new – does 
penetrate their defenses. The effectiveness of immunization programs depends critically 
on vaccines being available when they are needed – a condition that has not always 
been met. In the case of flu, for example, where the strains most prevalent in one year 
typically differ from those of previous years, manufacturing capacity is often not ade-
quate to rapidly produce the required vaccines. Building up such capacity between epi-
demics is a crucial measure for preventing them. Such an investment in infrastructure 
(i.e., expanding and ensuring the reliability of the production line) can also be invalu-
able in containing an epidemic once it has started. For some diseases, however, such as 
malaria in Africa, the relatively low return on such investment elicits little vaccine sup-
ply. In such situations, it may be appropriate for the government to make or subsidize 
investments in vaccine infrastructure. 
Other factors that help to strengthen bodies and thereby prevent epidemics will also 
likely require government intervention. Improving nutrition and providing a safe water 
supply are two examples, as is improving sanitation, which is important for depriving 
microbes of a favorable environment.  
Treating epidemics 
Even if all these prevention methods are in place, however, some diseases will slip 
through the net. The effective global campaign to combat SARS provides several guide-
lines for those attempting to reverse epidemics that have evaded prevention efforts. The 
campaign, which was coordinated by the World Health Organization, attempted to dis-
rupt the transmission pattern of the virus via a multi-pronged assault.
69 First, it limited 
movement of the virus by issuing a global travel warning against travel to and from in-
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  23fected areas. Second, it used the international media as a means of transmitting informa-
tion about the virus and explaining preventive measures. Third, it mobilized the interna-
tional scientific community to develop quarantine measures and identify the source of 
the virus – it took just one month to discover that a specific corona virus caused SARS, 
whereas the discovery that HIV caused AIDS took two years.  Fourth, the WHO quickly 
strengthened its existing global surveillance system by working with immigration de-
partments, airlines, and airports to track the spread of the virus.  
The economic impacts of some of these measures offer an interesting lesson for future 
epidemic containment efforts. As Michael Merson notes, the extensive media coverage 
of SARS “exaggerated public fear, feeding the growing stigma attached to the illness. 
Chinatowns were deserted, recovering SARS patients were turned down for jobs, and 
universities made it difficult for Asian students to attend commencement ceremonies. 
The economic impacts were immense.”
70 Although the travel warning and the use of the 
media were effective in highlighting awareness of the disease, their economic impact 
was disproportionate to its spread. Looking backwards, therefore, it may seem that the 
world overreacted. Nevertheless, when confronted with such situations, looking for-
ward, and essentially always in the absence of complete information, it is difficult to 
argue that extreme precautionary measures should not be taken.  
Modern technology, as the response to SARS showed, has great potential for combating 
epidemics. The WHO used a worldwide network of 11 laboratories to isolate the virus. 
The laboratories were connected by a shared website and held several telephone confer-
ences each day. International cooperation to improve health is not new – the smallpox 
vaccine, developed in England in the late 18
th century, was introduced to Latin America 
soon after by Spanish missionaries
71 – but new communication technologies have dra-
matically increased its scope. Developing countries now have expanded opportunities to 
learn from those with greater health care expertise, and international collaboration can 
more quickly spot emerging epidemics and more quickly mobilize to stifle them.  
Mass mobilization is an important tool for reversing epidemics’ spread. In Botswana, 
where over 100,000 people are in need of antiretroviral drug treatment for AIDS, the 
government committed to supplying treatment free of charge in January 2002. It has so 
far, however, been able to reach only a fraction of those in need, as the country lacks the 
medical staff to distribute the drugs and the stigma of HIV infection dissuades people 
from seeking treatment. In such settings, mobilizing non-medical personnel to provide 
treatment is likely to be the only way of reaching sufficient numbers of patients. Provid-
ing training in drug delivery to community health workers, traditional healers, and other 
                                                  
70 Ibid. 
71 William H McNeill (1976). Plagues and Peoples. Monticello Editions, New York. 
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pool of human resources. Many non-governmental organizations, too, have strong links 
with poor communities that governments struggle to reach, and businesses are often 
trusted sufficiently by their employees to transmit health messages and, perhaps, treat-
ment.  
Members of society should also be enlisted in the effort. Malcolm Gladwell, in The Tip-
ping Point, writes of the role of "connectors" in spreading social epidemics.
72 Connec-
tors are community members whose large range of contacts puts them in a strong posi-
tion to spark new trends or change behavior. With epidemics that require behavioral 
change, and particularly those such as HIV/AIDS whose containment depends on break-
ing stigma, enlisting connectors may be central to success. The stigma surrounding 
AIDS means many of its victims die rather than admit publicly to being infected. That 
stigma can be broken if influential individuals admit their infection and tell others it is 
nothing to be ashamed of. Nelson Mandela's acknowledgment that his son died of 
HIV/AIDS is an excellent example of this. 
Once a disease has broken through prevention efforts and has become an epidemic, 
mass mobilization is essential to its containment. An epidemic’s sudden, rapid spread is 
likely to be too much for resource-limited health systems to be able to cope with with-
out wider societal support. As an epidemic crosses borders and becomes a pandemic, 
the international community is likely to awaken to the threat, but it is in the latter’s in-
terests to prevent pandemics emerging by helping vulnerable countries to prepare for 
and deal quickly with new infectious disease threats. International mobilization was in-
strumental in limiting the effects of SARS, but had that mobilization occurred while the 
disease was confined to southern China, its economic effects would have been drasti-
cally reduced.  
Conclusion 
"In view of globalization, high productivity is an essential ingredient for 
competitiveness. [Yet] a number of factors account for the loss of pro-
ductivity, and one notable factor is the HIV/AIDS pandemic." Levy 
Mwanawas (President of Zambia, March 31, 2004) 
The links between epidemics and economics are broadly similar to those between health 
and wealth in general. Prosperous societies not only have better health; they are also at 
least somewhat protected against epidemics.  Like other health problems, meanwhile, 
epidemics can hamper economic development and trigger vicious spirals whereby wors-
ening health reduces wealth and diminishes the protection against further health threats. 
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strong impacts on the wealth of households, businesses and, in some cases, entire 
economies.  
Epidemics, however, pose different challenges than other health problems. The speed 
and unpredictability of their spread mean that policymakers have to strike a fine balance 
between acting swiftly (and without complete information) and guarding against the un-
due haste that may make matters many times worse. Presenting facts in a clear and 
measured way and having the patience not to begin drug treatment programs until cor-
rect adherence is at least probable, for example, can help contain both the health and 
economic impacts of an epidemic. 
Prevention of epidemics is also often feasible. Strengthening health systems and the 
populations they protect can help fend off disease outbreaks and limit the impacts of 
those that do emerge. Having strong quarantine measures ready to be employed to pre-
vent an incipient epidemic, and preparation for the mass mobilization of civil society, 
business, and community members will both relieve the strain on health services caused 
by present epidemics and reinforce society’s defenses against future outbreaks. How-
ever, a central obstacle to preventing epidemics is that spending on anti-epidemic and 
basic health infrastructure must be seen as an investment, with part of the return being 
the reduction in the future costs of epidemics. Policymakers are often influenced by 
short-term political considerations, causing them to pay too little heed to important 
longer-term realities. 
International cooperation is also vital for preventing and containing epidemics. Epidem-
ics can have economic impacts far beyond the borders of their source countries – and 
these potential economic impacts are often amplified by those aspects of the modern 
world that facilitate disease spread, affect tourism and trade, disseminate awareness and 
fear, and exacerbate counter-productive forms of protective behavior and isolationism. 
Indeed, both the health and economic consequences of epidemics suggest the value of 
the international community shoring up the health systems of poor countries to 
strengthen their capacities to prevent and to respond to epidemics.
73 This, combined 
with their effects on health, makes combating epidemics a global public good. Global-
ization can facilitate the spread of new diseases, but it also offers opportunities for tack-
ling them. International collaboration in epidemiological surveillance, scientific investi-
gation, and public health and medical efforts to tackle and treat disease has already 
proved effective in tackling diseases such as SARS. It is likely to become increasingly 
important as new epidemics emerge and old ones reemerge. 
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